PAKISTAN’S renewed focus on the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region is beginning to yield tangible results, particularly in defence
cooperation. What stands out in this outreach is its diversity: Pakistan is
engaging simultaneously with countries experiencing active conflict as well as
with relatively stable Gulf monarchies. More importantly, this evolving
engagement raises an important question about how these varied relationships
are shaping Pakistan’s strategic outlook, policy choices, and approach to
statecraft.
Pakistan’s relationship with the Gulf has long rested on
deep-rooted economic, political, and security ties shaped by history. However,
the recent expansion of engagement reflects a more deliberate and pragmatic
approach, suggesting that Islamabad is recalibrating its regional strategy.
This recalibration is not only about defence exports or military diplomacy; it
also offers Pakistan opportunities to observe and learn from different models
of statecraft, both in contexts of stability and in situations marked by
political fragmentation and conflict.
In this broader context, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin
Zayed Al Nahyan’s first official visit to Pakistan on Friday was particularly
significant. It came after Pakistan signed a defence cooperation agreement with
Saudi Arabia in mid-September, an agreement that attracted considerable
attention from observers who were closely watching how Pakistan would balance
relations with other Gulf states, especially the UAE and Qatar, given their
divergent positions on several MENA conflicts.
Sudan provides a clear example of these divergences. The UAE
has been widely reported to be supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while
Saudi Arabia has aligned itself with the Sudanese Armed Forces (several reports
indicate that Pakistan, through its defence cooperation, has engaged in ways
that benefit the SAF, effectively placing Islamabad alongside Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkiye, countries that have leaned towards supporting the Sudanese
army against the RSF). This suggests that, despite its careful diplomatic
language, Pakistan’s security partnerships are increasingly intersecting with
specific regional power alignments.
Pakistan’s role suits the architects of the new Middle East.
Libya presents a different but equally revealing case. Here,
Pakistan’s position appears closer to that of the UAE. Islamabad has engaged
openly with the eastern Libyan power structure led by Field Marshal Khalifa
Belqasim Haftar, while Saudi Arabia’s engagement with Haftar remains limited
and largely pragmatic. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s visit to eastern Libya, where
he met Haftar, the commander-in-chief of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, was
followed by reports that Pakistan had reached a defence deal worth over $4
billion to supply military equipment to the Libyan National Army, despite the
existence of a UN arms embargo.
The symbolism of this engagement was not lost on observers:
the meeting of two field marshals, an exceptionally rare rank in contemporary
global militaries, carried both political and military significance. Apart from
Libya, FM Asim Munir visited Cairo, where Pakistan and Egypt reaffirmed their
commitment to closer military cooperation, further underscoring Pakistan’s
expanding defence diplomacy across North Africa.
Beyond conflict theatres, Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue
to hold divergent positions on several regional and strategic issues, including
the Abraham Accords. Except for a few limited exceptions, Pakistan’s stance has
generally aligned more closely with Saudi Arabia, particularly on the Israel-Palestine
question. This alignment appears to be translating into more concrete outcomes
for Pakistan, especially in defence exports and broader economic cooperation.
It is not how long this cooperation with MENA region and
other African countries will last, as conflicts in many states are still
unfolding, and it is unclear which side will ultimately prevail. Although, as
per global diplomatic norms, Pakistan is showing constraint and officially
supporting peace initiatives, its tilt and deals will determine its character
in the eyes of these nations. It is not certain that the UAE president’s visit
is to incentivise Pakistan in the context of the Abraham Accords, or to offer
Pakistan some realignment in Islamabad’s strategic priorities in MENA. But it
has unfolded that Pakistan’s new approach is cultivating results.
It has to be seen how Pakistan will create balance in its
approach and relationship with its key economic and strategic allies in the
Gulf, but Pakistan’s realpolitik is in full swing, pragmatically pursuing its
policies in the Middle East, as the Gulf states, including the Saudis and the
UAE, were doing up till now in the case of India and Pakistan.
Pakistan’s role suits the architects of the new Middle East,
whether they are sitting in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, or beyond, not only
because of religious brotherhood, but also military power, which is more
accommodating towards their strategic and political interests. Pakistan has
gained geopolitical and geoeconomic strength through its accommodative
approach, but consolidating these gains has remained a challenge. Perhaps the
answer lies in the country’s state structure, which has similarities with many
states in the MENA region that are facing chronic political disorder. A Middle
Eastern scholar, Fawaz Gerges, in his book The Great Betrayal, sought to find
the roots of this political disorder. What he found was that an overemphasis on
strengthening security institutions creates two major problems.
First, it allows external actors to intervene in domestic
affairs and shape policies. Second, and more crucially, doctrinal authoritarian
regimes suppress natural ethnic, cultural, social, and religious divisions,
which democracy allows societies to address through continuous dialogue. These
divisions and divergences continue to thrive beneath the weight of suppression
and eventually surface in the form of fractured ideologies, toxic narratives,
and violent tendencies.
Gerges notes that the struggle in the Middle East is
multifaceted, extending far beyond territorial disputes. It is ideological,
cultural, and institutional, unfolding among a wide range of actors, including
conservatives, Islamists, nationalists, and ordinary citizens.
Perhaps there are lessons to be drawn from the region, but
this depends on political priorities. When certain policies appear to yield
economic and political gains, states often ignore deeper structural
similarities and the long-term risks they entail.
Muhammad Amir Rana, a security analyst, authored an article
that offers his personal analysis and perspective on security-related issues.
The article was originally published in Dawn, a leading Pakistani newspaper,
and was later republished by The Kabul Tribune (KT) for the information of its
readers. It is important to note that the views and opinions expressed in the
article are solely those of the author, Muhammad Amir Rana, and do not
necessarily reflect the editorial stance or responsibility of The Kabul
Tribune.
